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 ∗   George M. Armstrong, Jr., Judge Henry A. Politz Professor of Law, Paul 
M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, USA. e-
mail: Paul.Baier@law.lsu.edu This paper was read at the Fourth Worldwide Con-
gress of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists, 24-26 June, 2015, Montreal, Canada. I have 
borrowed heavily from my earlier canvasses of Justice Harry A. Blackmun and 
Justice Antonin Scalia in works cited herein. Montreal is an ideal civitas from 
which to sound my ideas anew—in search of lost time. I give my thanks to Mr. 
Justice Nicholas Kasirer, Cour d’appel du Québec, to Olivier Moréteau, Director 
of the Center of Civil Law Studies at LSU Law Center, to A. N. Yiannopoulos, 
Eason-Weinmann Chair Emeritus, Tulane University School of Law, and to Tar-
kan Orhon, of Göttingen, meinem wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter, for help with 
the books and for tightening up my German. This text was first published under 
the title THE CONSTITUTION AS CODE (Vandeplas Publ’g 2015) and is republished 
with the authorization of the publisher. 
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To the memory of John Henry Wigmore, Editorial Chair of the 
Association of American Law School’s Modern Legal Philosophy 
Series (1917). This treasure of continental legal philosophy trans-
lated into English guided Benjamin Nathan Cardozo in composing 
his Storrs Lectures at Yale, viz., THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS (1921), and opened my eyes to the epistemology of the Con-
stitution as Code. I read volume IX of this series, THE SCIENCE OF 
LEGAL METHOD, when I arrived at Louisiana State University, Paul 
M. Hebert Law Center, ca. 1972. A generation of teaching and 
scholarship in the field of constitutional interpretation has con-
firmed to my mind the link between Code and Constitution that Wig-
more first brought to my attention by way of the great gift of Rudolph 
von Jhering and François Gény in English translation.  
I. EINLEITUNG 
Justinian ermahnte seine Professoren der Rechtswissenschaften, 
die Wahrheit des Corpus Juris zu lehren. Es war ihnen verboten, 
über den Text hinaus zu gehen. 
My German is a tribute to Rudolph von Jhering of Göttingen, 
one of my Mount Royal Muses of Mount Helicon.1 I had better start 
over in English:— 
Justinian admonished his professors of law, Justinian ermahnte 
seine Professoren der Rechtswissenschaften, to teach the truth of the 
Corpus Juris, die Wahrheit des Corpus Juris zu lehren. They are 
forbidden to reach beyond it, Es war ihnen verboten, über den Text 
hinaus zu gehen. Here are Justinian’s words in English. I translate 
from the Latin: 
We say this because we have heard that even in the most 
splendid civitas of Alexandria and in that of Caesarea are 
unqualified men who take an unauthorized course and impart 
                                                                                                             
 1. I invite the reader to trek to the top of Mt. Helicon with a great civilian 
scholar, jurist, and professor, A. N. Yiannopoulos, “Megas Yiannopoulos,” Emer-
itus of Tulane University School of Law (New Orleans), who as my colleague at 
LSU in my early years of teaching nursed me on the milk of Max Reinstein (Chi-
cago), Albert Erensweig (Berkeley), and Gerhart Kegel (Cologne). I sat wide-
eyed in his Civil Law System course at LSU Law School, ca. 1972. After forty 
years’ friendship, I paid homage to him at a Louisiana Law Review banquet, viz., 
The Muses of Mount Helicon (March 21, 2014), in Paul R. Baier, SPEECHES 258 
(Louisiana Bar Foundation 2014). 
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a spurious erudition to their pupils; we warn them off these 
endeavors, under the threat that they are to be punished by a 
fine of ten pounds of gold and be driven from the civitas in 
which they commit a crime against the law instead of teach-
ing it.2 
Justice Antonin Scalia is a contemporary Justinian insisting that 
his colleagues on the Supreme Court of the United States have com-
mitted crimes against the Constitution by going beyond its text as 
originally understood by its Framers of 1787, by those who added 
the Bill of Rights of 1791, and by the citizens of the several states 
who ratified both.  
In other words, Mr. Justice Scalia has made a fortress out of the 
dictionary.3 
My task (meine Aufgabe) in the civitas of Montreal on the stage 
of the Fourth Worldwide Congress of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists is 
to invoke the letter and spirit of Rudolph von Jhering and François 
Gény against the spurious erudition of Antonin Scalia, the first Ro-
man on the Supreme Court of the United States.  
In a phrase: “The Constitution as Code.” 
First, the letter and spirit of von Jhering, from his Unsere Auf-
gabe (1857): “Durch das römische Recht, über das römische Recht 
hinaus.”4 “Through the Roman law, but beyond the Roman law.” 
This, at a time when Germany was without a code. The jurist’s task, 
von Jhering realized, was to reshape the old Roman law to fit the 
actuality of his times.  
                                                                                                             
 2. S. P. Scott’s translation THE CIVIL LAW, infra, note 68, is my standby 
pony.  
 3. Contra, Judge Learned Hand, Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 
(1945): “But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurispru-
dence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes 
always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imag-
inative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.” Another New York jurist, 
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, has said the same thing about constitutional interpre-
tation in his immortal classic The Nature of the Judicial Process. See Part 3f., 
infra.  
 4. Rudolph von Jhering, Unsere Aufgabe in I JAHRBÜCHER FÜR DIE 
DOGMATIK DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 52 (F. E. 
von Gerber, Rudolph von Jhering eds., Mauke, 1857). 
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Next, François Gény. One hundred years after the Code Civil, 
Gény’s Méthode d’Interprétation trumpets “life after text”5: 
One has tried to replace the syllogistic and dogmatic method, 
which deduced from the codes a completely fictitious and 
unreal “life” incapable of development and fixed definitely 
at the moment the logical construction was completed, by a 
method which is external rather than only internal as the first 
was, and the characteristic of which is the constant revival 
of codes, not by their own substance, but through the intro-
duction of all the elements of dynamic life itself.6 
This, from Raymond Salleilles’s Preface to Gény’s great book.7 
Salleilles concludes his Preface by saying, “I could not end with 
better words than those inspired by an analogous phrase of Jhering, 
which is the focal point of the whole book of Mr. Gény: “Through 
the Civil Code; but beyond the Civil Code.”8 
II. AIX-EN-PROVENCE 
Next, via Air France, we sojourn from Montreal to Aix-en-Pro-
vence, France, an ancient Roman outpost for the troops. I taught 
classes there with Justice Harry A. Blackmun of the Supreme Court 
of the United States.  
We were together at Aix-Marseille-III, its Faculté de droit, the 
school of Portalis, progenitor of the Code Civil:—“The Codes of 
                                                                                                             
 5. “Of course, it pains Justice Scalia to see the Court surpassing its bounds. 
But, truth to tell, the Court has never bound itself to text or original meaning. Life 
after text frees the judge. La vie après le texte libère le juge.” Paul R. Baier, The 
Supreme Court, Justinian, and Antonin Scalia: Twenty Years in Retrospect, 67 
LA. L. REV. 489, 514 (2007). 
 6. Raymond Saleilles, Preface to FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE 
D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF (1899 ; 2d ed. 1919, Jaro 
Mayda trans. Louisiana State Law Institute 1963), p. LXXXI. 
 7. Professor Marie-Claire Belleau, of the Université Laval, Québec, renders 
both Salleilles and Gény as “juristes inquiets” in her vibrant reconstruction of 
their views, viz., The “Juristes Inquiets”: Legal Classicism and Criticism in Early 
Twentieth-Century France, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 379. Thanks to Nicholas Kasirer 
for bringing this article to my attention.  
 8. Salleilles, supra note 6, Preface, at LXXXVI. 
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nations are the fruit of the passage of time; but properly speaking, 
we do not make them.”9  
Portalis’s foresight, I trust, is familiar to all of you. I owe my 
first reading of him to my French colleague, friend, and mixed-ju-
risdiction jurist Professor Alain Levasseur—his enduring Code Na-
poleon or Code Portalis? 
The constitution is a code, is it not? 
Levasseur’s article sparked my teaching of the United States 
Constitution as Code. Liberty is open-ended; the judge must give it 
life. Par la constitution, mais au-delà de la constitution. 
At Aix, Justice Blackmun voiced the same insight: “No body of 
men 200 years ago could determine what our problems are today. 
That is, I suppose, what we have courts for”—“to construe the Con-
stitution in the light of current problems.”10 We talked anew of the 
timeless problem of judicial interpretation of written texts, from Na-
poleon’s Code to America’s Constitution, aside the aged fountains 
of Aix where Portalis, le père du code civil, played as a little boy. 
This was the summer of 1986, the year of Bowers v. Hardwick.11 
You remember Bowers v. Hardwick: The Supreme Court sustained 
the constitutionality of Georgia’s sodomy law as applied to two 
adult homosexual males caught in flagrante dilicto in the privacy of 
their own bedroom by a wandering policeman. Mr. Justice 
Blackmun dissented.  
“We cannot live with original intent,”12 he told our Cours Mir-
abeau students. 
                                                                                                             
 9. The Preliminary Discourse of Portalis (M. Shael Herman, trans.), quoted 
in Alain Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 762, 773 
(1969). 
 10. Hearing Before Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate on the 
Nomination of Harry A. Blackmun, of Minnesota, to be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 35 (1970). 
 11. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
 12. The quotation is taken from the transcript of the sound recordings of our 
Aix 1992 classes (hereinafter cited as Aix ’92 Transcripts) (recorded with Justice 
Blackmun’s permission; tapes and transcript on file with the author). 
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The Justice and I returned to Aix in 1992, the year of Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,13 which saved 
Roe v. Wade14 by a hair. More on Roe v.Wade and François Gény a 
little later in meine Aufgabe nach von Jhering. 
Justice Antonin Scalia,“Il Giudice Justinianus,”15 roars in his 
dissent in Casey: “We should get out of this area, where we have no 
right to be, and where we do neither ourselves nor the country any 
good by remaining.”16 
By way of going through Salleilles but beyond him, let me quote 
the preface to our teaching materials at Aix, bound in France’s tri-
color red, white, and blue, entitled Constitutional Interpretation: 
Les procédés d’élaboration (1986): 
The American Constitution, like the French Civil Code, con-
sists of words on paper. Constitutional interpretation begins 
with words but almost always travels beyond text to the 
realm of ideas. Whether we shall have more or less liberty, 
more or less privacy, more or less equality, depends on the 
work ways of the judge.17 
Our materials paid special attention to the development of the 
right of privacy, from Griswold v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade, to 
Bowers v. Hardwick, and beyond.  
We promised our students a few continental comparisons in 
class. We advised them that our materials were aimed at exploring 
the role of the judge and the place of intellectual personality and 
process in giving shape to the law of the Constitution. 
                                                                                                             
 13. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 15. My characterization, in Paul R. Baier, The Supreme Court, Justinian, and 
Antonin Scalia, supra note 5, at 521. 
 16. Planned Parenthood, supra note 13, at 1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part).  
 17. Harry A. Blackmun & Paul R. Baier, Preface to CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: PROCÉDÉS D’ÉLABORATION vi (June/July 1992) (teaching ma-
terials for a summer course on American Constitutional Law at Aix-en-Provence, 
France) (on file Law Library, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Baton Rouge, La., 
USA). 
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We borrowed the subtitle of our Aix teaching materials from 
Gény’s Les procédés d’élaboration du droit civil,18 a lecture deliv-
ered at Nancy in 1910.  
At the end of his little book Gény emphasizes the role, which he 
suggests was neglected by theoreticians of his time, des procédés 
intellectuels et de la terminologie dans l’élaboration juridique,19 the 
role of the intellectual process and of the terminology in juridical 
elaboration.  
Gény of course was talking about the French Civil Code. His 
greatest work was his study of the methods of interpretation and the 
sources of private positive law, Méthode d’interprétation et sources 
en droit privé positif, which was published in 1899 and translated 
into English by Jaro Mayda under the auspices of the Louisiana 
State Law Institute in 1963. Only because I teach law in Louisiana, 
did I receive the gift of Gény.  
Imagine my joy when an esteemed scholar among worldwide 
jurists, Nicholas Kasirer, quondam doyen of McGill University Law 
School, Montreal, now Mr. Justice Kasirer of the Cour d’appel du 
Québec, mentioned my name in trumpeting to the world that: 
Recently one scholar linked U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Harry A. Blackmun’s thinking on the Bill of Rights to 
Gény’s libre recherche scientifique, citing Jaro Mayda as the 
linguistic go-between.20 
True, my place was only in a Kasirer footnote. But I thank Jus-
tice Kasirer for his encouragement as I continue to plead the case for 
seeing Gény’s Méthode at work in constitutional interpretation in 
the United States, or, indeed, at Ottawa. 
                                                                                                             
 18. François Gény, Les procédés d’élaboration du droit civil (1910), in LES 
MÉTHODES JURIDIQUES : LEÇONS FAITES AU COLLÈGE LIBRE DES SCIENCES 
SOCIALES en 1910, pp. 174, 196 (Henry Barthélemy ed., 1911). 
 19. Id., at 196. 
 20. Nicholas Kasirer, François Gény’s libre recherche scientifique as a 
Guide for Legal Translation, 61 LA. L. REV. 331, 350 n.74 (2001). 
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There is a universality in going beyond text to shape the living 
law—either of France’s code civil, America’s bill of rights, or Can-
ada’s charter of rights and freedoms. 
Following Gény and Kasirer, I offer my own Montreal sound21: 
Par la constitution, mais au-delà de la constitution. 
III. BEWEISE 
Now to the proofs. My itemization lacks elaboration. This is on 
purpose. “Nous faisons une théorie et non un spicilège.”22 This from 
Holmes’s preface to his great book, The Common Law (1881). 
I haven’t written a great book. Perhaps my Montreal composi-
tion à la Gény is a start. Here is my list of scholarly notes. Jaro 
Mayda’s are breathtaking.23 I only offer a few. 
a. Madison’s ninth amendment to the bill of rights authorizes 
going beyond the enumeration of rights to vouchsafe others retained 
by the people.  
                                                                                                             
 21. Cf. Nicholas Kasirer, That Montreal Sound: The Influence of French Le-
gal Ideas and the French Language on the Civil Law Expressed in English (37th 
John H. Tucker, jr., Lecture in Civil Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana 
State University, 4/10/14, forthcoming in 9 J. CIVIL L. STUD. (2016). 
 22. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881), Preface, p. 
iv, quoting Lehuërou. 
 23. Mayda’s introduction to his translation of Gény’s Méthode includes 267 
footnotes, a display of staggering erudition. See “Gény’s Méthode after 60 Years: 
A Critical Introduction,” in FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET 
SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF (1899; 2d ed. 1919) (Jaro Mayda trans., Loui-
siana State Law Institute 1963), Introduction, pp. V-LXXVI. Thereafter, in progres-
sion, MAYDA publishes FRANÇOIS GÉNY AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE (Louisi-
ana State University Press 1978), with endnotes I-XCIV, pp. 103-228, and with a 
sympathetic Introduction by Justice Albert Tate, Jr., of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court. Justice Tate was duly impressed: 
For me, the important perceptions included new insights into viewing the 
law-in-being as involving a sharing rather than a separation of law-cre-
ating powers between the legislature and the judiciary, at least in the de-
velopment of private-law precepts, and also, by reason of explicit and 
reasoned formulation, into the judge’s duty to do justice without a spe-
cific text as being an integral (although exceptional) part of the life of 
the law. 
Id., p. xix. The present author’s théorie de Gény goes beyond private to public law 
precepts—par la constitution, mais au-delà de la constitution—with thanks to 
Judge Tate for his encouragement and friendship over the years. 
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A deep thinker before me in Louisiana, Tulane University Law 
School’s Mitchell Franklin,24 linked the ninth amendment to civilian 
methodology in going beyond the text to secure the fundamental 
rights of the citizen.25 Griswold v. Connecticut26 is his exemplar.  
The right of privacy is fundamental; it is not textual. The court 
gives it life. Franklin is right. To read him is to be astounded.27  
Thomas I. Emerson, a Yale Law Professor and common law 
lawyer, who won Griswold v. Connecticut in the Supreme Court of 
the United States, is more down to earth: 
The precise source of the right of privacy is not as important 
as the fact that six Justices found such a right to exist, and 
thereby established it for the first time as an independent 
constitutional right. It was a bold innovation.28 
 
Here, whether he knows it or not, Emerson is echoing von 
                                                                                                             
 24. “Mitchell Franklin came to Tulane University School of Law in 1930 as 
a young New York lawyer with impeccable credentials and no teaching experi-
ence. He retired from Tulane in 1967 with an enviable reputation as a teacher, 
lawyer, philosopher, historian, political scientist, essayist, photographer, and col-
orful personality.” The Board of Editors, Mitchell Franklin: A Tribute, 54 Tulane 
L. Rev. 809 (1980). “He postulates that, under the ninth amendment, novel con-
stitutional problems must be solved by the analogical development of constitu-
tional texts in the civilian tradition, and not by arbitrary, subjective judicial deter-
mination.” Id., at 809-10. 
 25. Mitchell Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and Its 
Implications for Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut; 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 40 TUL. L. REV. 487 (1966). 
 26. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 27. See, e.g., Mitchell Franklin, Concerning the Influence of Roman Law on 
the Formation of the Constitution of the United States, 38 TUL. L. REV. 621 
(1964). For real power in a young scholar, see Franklin’s contribution to RECUEIL 
D’ÉTUDES sur LES SOURCES DU DROIT EN L’HONNEUR DE FRANÇOIS GÉNY (1977), 
TOME II, TITRE 1, Ch. III, M. Gény and Juristic Ideals and Method in the United 
States, pp. 30-45. Franklin says of the allocation of legislative and judicial author-
ity, and the problem of juridical method involved, “The point of departure will 
have to be M. Geny’s Méthode d’interpretation, which is the flower of 2,000 years 
of Romanist thinking upon the problem of juridical method, a problem hardly yet 
perceived in America, a problem calling for the régime of the university law 
school.” Id., at 45. See also Philip Moran, Mitchell Franklin and the United States 
Constitution, 70 TELOS 26, 36, 37 (Winter 1986-87): “Franklin considers the ninth 
amendment a use of the method of analogy in Roman law”; “as a dialectical solu-
tion to the problem of how to negate or extend the Constitution while preserving 
existing rights.”  
 28. Thomas I. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. 
REV. 219 (1965). 
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Jhering and Gény. 
b. Recall Chief Justice John Marshall’s aperçu, “[i]n consider-
ing this question, we must never forget it is a constitution we are 
expounding.”29 The question at hand was whether Congress may 
charter a national bank. Marshall held yes, relying on the necessary 
and proper clause. I am sure Gény would agree. France has its 
banque nationale.  
But for purposes of my composition de Montréal, F. Gény would 
focus on John Marshall’s italics, “a constitution we are expound-
ing.” Even in the absence of a necessary and proper clause, Gény 
would sustain going beyond the text of enumerated powers so as to 
sustain a national bank. Banque nationale; banque des États-unis. 
c. Enter Mr. Justice Holmes, what he said about reading the Con-
stitution of the United States in Missouri v. Holland.30 You remem-
ber the case dealt with migratory birds on the wing over the sover-
eign state of Missouri. The State claimed that Congress had no 
power to protect such migratory birds flying sky high over its sov-
ereign soil.  
Holmes, perched on Mt. Olympus, sided with the U.S. game 
warden under Congress’s Migratory Bird Treaty Act, viz.: “[I]t is 
not lightly to be assumed that in matters requiring national action, 
‘a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civ-
ilized government’ is not to be found.”31 Holmes goes beyond text: 
[W]hen we are dealing with words that are a constituent act, 
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize 
that they have called into life a being the development of 
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most 
gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or 
hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a cen-
tury and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to 
prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be 
considered in the light of our whole experience and not 
                                                                                                             
 29. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819) (Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s italics, “a constitution”). 
 30. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 31. Id., at 433. 
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merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.32 
d. The same year François Gény delivered his lecture at Nancy, 
Les procédés d’élaboration du droit civil (1910), Justice Joseph 
McKenna at Washington, D.C., elaborated the meaning of the eighth 
amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits “cruel 
and unusual punishment.” This is a contemporaneous instance of the 
constitution as code. I mean Weems v. United States.33  
The Court rescued Weems from a punishment of “cardena tem-
poral” with harsh ancillary penalties for stealing 416 pesos—a pit-
tance—from the public till. The punishments, said the Court “excite 
wonder in minds accustomed to a more considerate adaptation of 
punishment to the degree of the crime.”34 
You can read the details of the punishment in the report (217 
U.S. 349). The important point here is that the majority went beyond 
the text of the amendment, or found within its spirit,35 a precept of 
justice given voice for the first time: 
Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who have 
formed their conception of the relation of a state to even its 
offending citizens from the practice of the American com-
monwealths, and believe that it is a precept of justice that 
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportional 
to the offense.36 
                                                                                                             
 32. Id. 
 33. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (per McKenna, J.). 
 34. Id., at 365. 
 35. “Spirit” is purpose, von Jhering’s Zweck im Recht (Göttingen 1877). Or, 
if you will, “penumbras,” “emanations” of Justice Douglas’s méthode et technique 
in Griswold v. Connecticut. Spirit guides the judge in reading text and in going 
beyond it in order to adapt the law to current social mores, to current reality. Cf. 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (per Kennedy, J.); Carter v. Canada (At-
torney General), 2015 SCC 5 (Feb. 6, 2015); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 
(1992) (extending the eighth amendment to cover prison conditions in Louisiana’s 
state penitentiary. Justice Thomas’s dissent (joined by Justice Scalia) makes the 
point of this paper: “The Eighth Amendment is not, and should not be turned into, 
a National Code of Prison Regulation.” 503 U.S., at 28. But it has been. Durch 
das römische Recht, über das römische Recht hinaus. 
 36. 217 U.S., at 366-367. 
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Beyond the eighth amendment, the proportionality principle is a 
fundamental measuring rod of the constitutionality of laws that im-
pinge on individual rights. This is true of the decisions of the Su-
preme Court of the United States, of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
of the “fundamental principles of justice” that give life to the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, La Charte canadienne des 
droits et libertés. 
I am sorry to report to you that Louisiana’s Justice Edward 
Douglass White, who succeeded Melville Fuller as Chief Justice of 
the United States in 1910, dissented in Weems. A jurist of wide 
learning and large girth, E. D. White’s dissent in Weems is Justinian 
come to life: 
Turning aside, therefore, from mere emotional tendencies 
and guiding my judgment alone by the aid of the reason at 
my command, I am unable to agree with the ruling of the 
court. As, in my opinion, that ruling rests upon an interpre-
tation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 
Eighth Amendment, never before announced, which is re-
pugnant to the natural import of the language employed in 
the clause, and which interpretation curtails the legislative 
power of Congress to define and punish crime by asserting a 
right of judicial supervision over the exertion of that power, 
in disregard of the distinction between the legislative and ju-
dicial departments of the Government, I deem it my duty to 
dissent and state my reasons.37 
In other words, Joseph McKenna should be fined ten pounds of 
gold and driven from the civitas of Washington, D.C. 
Twenty-eight pages of E. D. White’s magisterial reasoning in 
Weems follow, at the heart of which is White’s rejection of the con-
ception “that by judicial construction constitutional limitations may 
be made to progress so as to ultimately include that which they were 
not intended to embrace . . . .”38  
Mr. Justice Holmes joined White’s dissent. This is positivism 
writ large in denial of the constitution as code.  
                                                                                                             
 37. 217 U.S., at 385 (White, J., dissenting). 
 38. Id., at 411. 
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The jurisprudence of the eighth amendment since 1910, I am 
happy to report, is convincing proof that Gény’s technique is alive 
and functioning in the constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court of the United States—whether the justices realize it or not.39  
When I composed our teaching materials for Aix I asked Justice 
Blackmun in chambers whether he had ever heard of François Gény. 
His answer? “No.”  
e. As I teach it, Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s opinion for the 
Court in Roe v. Wade is an exemplar of von Jhering’s Zweck im 
Recht (1877) and Gény’s libre recherche scientifique (1899). His 
lonely search at the Mayo Clinic on abortion and his cardigan read-
ing of “liberty” represent a classical instance of Jhering’s purpose in 
law and quasi legislation in the style of Gény.  
You are free to question my assertion, of course. But first you 
must read the 71 pages of Professor Jaro Mayda’s critical introduc-
tion to his English translation of Gény’s Méthode, the 460 pages of 
its translated text, and the 109 pages of an epilog added by Gény to 
his second edition—640 pages in all. More conveniently, at this 
Worldwide Congress of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists, I proffer Jaro 
Mayda himself as expert witness. He would be delighted, I assure 
you, to appear on the Montreal stage of World Society of Mixed 
Jurisdiction Jurists. 
In the presence of serious social problems (e.g., the cost to 
society of unwanted and uncared-for children, the high 
health and life risks resulting from surreptitious abortion 
practices, the disproportionate burden carried in both in-
stances by the underprivileged socioeconomic groups), the 
                                                                                                             
 39. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002):“[I]n light of the dra-
matic shift in the legislative landscape that has occurred it the past 13 years” [since 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)], held: the execution of mentally retarded 
criminals is “cruel and unusual punishment”; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005), abandoning Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and exercising 
“our own independent judgment,” held: execution of juvenile offenders younger 
than 18 who have committed capital offences is “cruel and unusual punishment” 
in violation of the eighth amendment; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), 
held: “The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence 
on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.” 
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Court finds a teleological gap (created partly by existing leg-
islation). It fills it with reference to the best available medi-
cal information about the viability of the fetus as an inde-
pendent unit of life. And it rules according to the mother’s 
right of decision.40 
Mayda’s critique à la Gény of Justice Harry Blackmun’s opinion 
of the Court in Roe v. Wade was rendered in 1978. Justice 
Blackmun’s teaching of the abortion decision at Aix-en-Provence in 
1986, and again in 1992, as I have described it elsewhere,41 affirms 
Professor Mayda’s assessment.  
f. The fourteenth amendment guarantees liberty, equality, due 
process of law. These are words that do not define themselves. 
Judges fill in these linguistic gaps. One of our greatest judges, Ben-
jamin Nathan Cardozo, taught the connection between code and 
constitution in his Storrs lectures at Yale. They have come down to 
us as Cardozo’s immortal classic The Nature of the Judicial Process 
(1921).  
Hear him anew: “Today a great school of continental jurists is 
pleading for a still wider freedom of adaptation and construction.”42 
The judge as the interpreter for the community of its sense 
of law and order must supply omissions, correct uncertain-
ties, and harmonize results with justice through a method of 
free decision—“libre recherche scientifique.” That is the 
view of Gény and Ehrlich and Gmelin and others. Courts are 
to “search for light among the social elements of every kind 
that are the living force behind the facts they deal with.”43 
Cardozo adds, quoting Ehrlich’s Freie Rechtsfindung und freie 
Rechtswissenschaft (1903), “[t]here is no guarantee of justice except 
the personality of the judge.”44 Harry A. Blackmun comes to mind. 
                                                                                                             
 40. JARO MAYDA, FRANÇOIS GENY AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 86 (1978). 
 41. Paul R. Baier, Mr. Justice Blackmun, Reflections from the Cours Mira-
beau, 43 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 707 (1994). 
 42. BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
42 (Yale Univ. Press 1921). 
 43. Id., at 16. 
 44. Id., at 16-17. 
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And what of the Constitution as Code? Here is what Cardozo 
thinks of going through the constitution but beyond it: “The same 
problems of method, the same contrasts between the letter and the 
spirit, are living problems in our own land and law.”45 Then comes 
this: “[a]bove all in the field of constitutional law, the method of free 
decision has become, I think, the dominant one today. The great 
generalities of the constitution have a content and a significance 
that vary from age to age.”46 
“No one shall be deprived of liberty without due process. Here 
is a concept of the greatest generality,”47 says Cardozo. “Yet it is put 
before the courts en bloc. Liberty is not defined. Its limits are not 
mapped and charted. How shall they be known.”48  
Cardozo’s answer is to see the ideal of liberty as a “fluid and 
dynamic conception,” which “must also underlie the cognate notion 
of equality.”49  
“From all of this, it results that the content of constitutional im-
munities is not constant but varies from age to age.”50 
At this point, I can hear Justice Scalia roaring at me: “Sed truffa 
est.” “But this is nonsense.”  
No it isn’t. Cardozo—Scalia’s New York predecessor on the 
Court—borrowing directly from Gény, tells us: 
The method of free decision sees through the transitory par-
ticulars and reaches what is permanent behind them. Inter-
pretation, thus enlarged, becomes more than the ascertain-
ment of the meaning and intent of the lawmakers whose col-
lective will has been declared. It supplements the declara-
tions, and fills the vacant spaces, by the same processes and 
methods that have built up the customary law.51 
                                                                                                             
 45. Id., at 16. 
 46. Id., at 17 (emphasis added). 
 47. Id., at 76. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id., at 81-82. 
 50. Id., at 82-813. 
 51. Id., at 17. 
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Constitutional law has been built up the same way: “The Con-
stitution as Code.” Or, à la Gény:—“The Civil Law of the Constitu-
tion.”  
g. Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick 
(1986) was seventeen years ahead of its time. Bowers has been over-
ruled by Lawrence v. Texas (2003).  
Liberty evolves52:—judicial interpretation in “le sens évolu-
tif.”53  
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the Court is another item 
of proof. His peroration in Lawrence v. Texas is an echo of Portalis, 
of von Jhering, of Gény: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known 
of the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, 
they might have been more specific. They did not presume 
to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain 
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the 
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can in-
voke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.54 
Enough of proofs, enough of spicilège. What of théorie? 
IV. SIENA. 
Here it is necessary that we board the TGV, depart from Aix-en-
Provence, and travel to Siena, Italy, by way of the Uffizi Museum 
in Florence. Justice Scalia is waiting for us at the University of Si-
ena.  
Good teaching requires a clash of views. At Siena Justice Scalia 
held court on the subject of separation of powers and the rule of law 
                                                                                                             
 52. “Nothing is stable. Nothing absolute. All is fluid and changeable. There 
is an endless ‘becoming.’” Id., at 28. 
 53. “The President of the highest French Court, M. Ballot-Beaupré, ex-
plained, a few years ago, that the provisions of the Napoleonic legislation had 
been adapted to modern conditions by a judicial interpretation in ‘le sens évolu-
tif.’” Id., at 84. 
 54. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (per Kennedy, J.). 
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for Tulane University School of Law. This was July 1991. I tagged 
along, prepared our teaching materials, and joined him in class. 
Chief Judge Stephen Breyer (as he then was) by happenstance was 
in Europe. He joined us. He sat on the backbench.  
These two jurists voice competing theories of constitutional in-
terpretation.55  
Scalia, J., and Breyer, J., are foils. They have captivated scholars 
of the Supreme Court for two decades. In our Siena classroom they 
reminded me of the competing schools of thought in the early Ro-
man Principate.56 The Sabinians, founded by Capito, were firm ad-
herents of the empire inclined to follow tradition and to rest upon 
authority. The Proculians, on the other hand, founded by Labeo, 
were republicans of independent mind and prone to innovation.57 To 
me, Justice Scalia is a good Sabinian, Justice Blackmun a soft-spo-
ken Proculian.  
Il Giudice Justinianus, Justice Antonin Scalia, would scoff at the 
idea that François Gény has any role to play in elaborating the U.S. 
Constitution.  
Mr. Justice Scalia would reject out of hand, and bluntly, his 
friend Herr Baier’s théorie de Montréal—“par la constitution, mais 
                                                                                                             
 55. Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 44-45 (Amy Gutterman ed., 1997) (“Perhaps the most glar-
ing defect of Living Constitutionalism, next to its incompatibility with the whole 
antievoluntionary purpose of a constitution, is that there is no agreement, and no 
chance of agreement, upon what is to be the guiding principle of the evolution.”), 
with STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 5-6 (2005) (“My thesis . . . finds in the Constitution’s democratic 
objective not simply restraint on judicial power or an ancient counterpart of more 
modern protection, but also a source of judicial authority and an interpretative aid 
to more effective protection of ancient and modern liberty alike.”)  
 56. Peter Stein, The Two Schools of Jurists in the Early Roman Principate, 
31 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 8 (1972).  
 57. H.F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE 
STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 384 (3d ed. 1972), details the two “schools” of jurists—
the Proculians and the Sabinians: “Pomponius says that Labeo and Capito (in the 
time of Augustus) ‘first created what may be called two sects,’ and that whereas 
Labeo was a very able man, learned in many branches of knowledge and an inno-
vator in law, Capito held fast by traditional doctines.” Id. at 378. 
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au-delà de la constitution.” This is foreign nonsense to the Scalian-
istae.  
In one of his more sarcastic opinions, Justice Scalia’s razor mim-
ics Chief Justice John Marshall: “We must never forget that it is a 
Constitution for the United States that we are expounding.”58 Ex-
pounding the United States Constitution, Justice Scalia exclaims in 
his Lawrence v. Texas dissent:  
What Texas has chosen to do is well within the range of dem-
ocratic action, and its hand should not be stayed through the 
invention of a brand-new “constitutional right” by a Court 
impatient of democratic change.59 
You will remember Justinian’s warning to his professors of law, 
Theophilus, Dorotheus, Isodorus, Anatolius, and Salaminius, to 
mention a majority of five, at the outset of the Digest. They are to 
teach the truth of the Corpus Juris. They are forbidden to reach be-
yond it. 
Let me recall to your minds the proportionality principle of the 
eighth amendment. In Roper v. Simmons,60 the Supreme Court held 
that the eighth amendment forbids the death penalty for a seventeen-
year-old who bound and gagged a woman with duct tape, tied her 
hands and feet together with electrical wire, and threw her from a 
bridge above the Meramec River, drowning her in the water below. 
Roars our lion-hearted friend Justice Scalia, jaws wide open: 
Bound down, indeed. What a mockery today’s opinion 
makes of Hamilton’s expectation, announcing the Court’s 
conclusion that the meaning of our Constitution has changed 
over the past 15 years—not, mind you, that this Court’s de-
cision of 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution 
has changed.61 
                                                                                                             
 58. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis added). A plurality of the Court, per Stevens, J., citing the law 
of foreign nations, held that the eighth amendment prohibits the execution of per-
sons under the age of fifteen at the time of the offense. 
 59. 539 U.S., at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 60. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 61. Id., at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Kennedy’s opinion of the Court relies on the views of 
foreign jurisdictions in outlawing the death penalty for minors. An-
tonin Scalia is not impressed: “I do not believe that the meaning of 
our Eighth Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provi-
sions of our Constitution, should be determined by the subjective 
views of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners. I 
dissent.”62 
V. UNA SPINA NEL PIEDE 
It fell to me to write our Siena examination questions. Seeing an 
exquisite sculpture in the Uffizi Museum of a little boy pulling a 
spine out of his foot gave me an idea. I told our students about the 
sculpture, “Una spina nel piede.” 
Question No.1 asked the students to write an essay demonstrat-
ing how Justice Antonin Scalia has proved himself a spine in the 
foot of the Court. Scalia thought this a clever question. He has von 
Jhering’s quick wit.63 When we first met our Siena students, antici-
pating the examination, I told them about my visit to the Uffizi Mu-
seum, about the little boy bending over to remove the thorn in his 
foot, about . . . —Scalia butted in, loudly: “Oh, that’s going to on 
the examination!” It was. 
The students paid no attention to his Honor’s premonition: a 
mangiare la pizza. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 62. Id.  
 63. “Jhering had a strong sense of humor and satire.” Johann George Gmelin, 
Dialecticism and Technicality: The Need of a Sociological Method, in THE 
SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD (1917), PART I, THE PROBLEM OF THE JUDGE, ch. III, 
pp. 85, 108 n.45. What else about our Mount Royal Muse Rudolph von Jhering? 
I like this: “He possessed a joyous nature such as is not found often among those 
of conspicuous learning.” Adolph Merkel, Rudolph von Ihering, in ZWECK IM 
RECHT (Isaac Husik trans. Boston, 1913), Appendix I.  
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VI. LA THÉORIE DE SIENNE 
 One more observation of la théorie de Sienne. I played the role 
of provocateur. Justice Scalia declined to witness the chaos of Si-
ena’s famous palio horse race after a false start the day before. In-
stead, we took a walk to see the Catedrale di Santa Maria (Siena’s 
famous “Duomo”). “Religion statt Pferdefleisch” (“religion over 
horsemeat”) von Jhering would say.  
On our walk I mentioned Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes’s 
interpretation for the Court in Home Building and Loan v. Blaisdell 
(1934)64 apropos the Contracts Clause. Hughes, of course, was the 
Supreme Court’s great chief justice of the twentieth century, as John 
Marshall was of the nineteenth.  
I paraphrased Hughes in Siena. I quote him exactly in Montreal: 
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the 
time of its adoption it means today, it is intended to say that 
the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the 
interpretation of the framers with the conditions and outlook 
of their time, would have place upon them, the statement car-
ries its own refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow 
conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memora-
ble warning: “We must never forget it is a constitution we 
are expounding (McCulloch v. Maryland); “a constitution 
intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be 
adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”65 
Justice Scalia took me and Hughes to task. Those who imply 
from Marshall’s utterance that the Constitution must change from 
age to age are mistaken. “But that is a canard.”66 
Justice Scalia of Siena reminds me of Bartolus of Sassoferrato. 
Bartolus frequently expressed scorn for opinions he considered fool-
ish. “Sed truffa est.” “But this is nonsense.” Justice Scalia, I am sure, 
would condemn my idée au-delà de Montréal as:— “Absurd.” He 
has said the same thing of his colleagues’ rulings: 
                                                                                                             
 64. Home Building and Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 65. Id., at 442-43 (citation omitted). 
 66. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 
853 (1989). 
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The notion that the Constitution of the United States, de-
signed, among other things, “to establish Justice, insure do-
mestic Tranquility, . . . and secure the Blessings of Liberty 
to ourselves and our Posterity,” prohibits the States from 
simply banning this visibly brutal means of eliminating our 
half-born posterity is quite simply absurd.67 
VII. JUSTINIAN’S ZWECK IM RECHT 
Justinian’s purpose in collecting the extracts of jurists that com-
pose the Digest is to prevent judicial caprice, to avoid in his own 
words, “cases [being] disposed of rather according to the will of the 
judge than by the authority of law.”68 Here is the birthright of Justice 
Antonin Scalia from the lips of Justinian himself.  
But Justice Scalia’s textualism, his insistence on abiding the let-
ter of the law as originally understood by the citizenry at the time of 
adoption of the Constitution, is not the sole measure of judicial duty 
as conceived in the Digest.  
Ulpianus tells us: “[t]he law obtains its name from justice; . . . 
law is the art of knowing what is good and just.”69 A second birth-
right makes judges “priests of this art, for we cultivate justice aiming 
(if I am not mistaken) at a true, and not a pretended philosophy.”70 
Justice Harry A. Blackmun told us at Aix, “I think we should 
pursue justice. Some of us anyway, on the Supreme Court, ought to 
keep justice in mind, if not constantly every once in a while at 
least.”71 
VIII. OTTAWA 
Last stop on our voyage Gény is Ottawa, Ontario, home of the 
Supreme Court of Canada. What do we find there?  
                                                                                                             
 67. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 68. Second Preface to the Digest, in THE CIVIL LAW, INCLUDING THE 
TWELVE TABLES, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, THE OPINIONS OF PAULUS, THE 
ENACTMENTS OF JUSTINIAN, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF LEO 189, 195 (S. P. Scott 
trans., Central Trust Co., Cincinnati, 1932). 
 69. Id., at 209. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Aix ’92 Transcripts, supra note 12. 
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A late decision of the Supreme Court of Canada holds that life 
includes death. In other words, Section 7 of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms protects the right to “die with dignity.” This is Carter 
v. Canada.72 The facts of life and death—libre recherche scien-
tifique—are in the trial record.  
“The legislative landscape on the issue of physician-assisted 
death has changed in the two decades since Rodriguez,” says the 
Court. Canadian society requires a new rule, a new freedom. The 
ruling is unanimous. The judgment is delivered by the Court: 
The prohibition on physician-assisted dying infringes the 
right to life, liberty and security of the person in a manner 
not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 
It’s all there, a bold innovation. Read it for yourself.  
“Through the charter, but beyond the charter.”  
And just the other day the Supreme Court of Canada advised the 
World that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms imposes a 
duty of religious neutrality on the state. “This duty results from an 
evolving interpretation of freedom of conscience and religion.” Par 
la constitution, mais au-delà de la constitution.73  
IX. FERTIG; FINI 
Meine lieben Kollegen in Montreal, unserer Voyage von Jhering 
und Gény is finished, am Ende. 
Rudolf von Jhering et François Gény und ich selbst grüssen her-
zlich The Right Honorable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice, and 
her side justices, of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Aufwiedersehen Montreal. Vielen Dank. Merci beaucoup. Au re-
voir. 
 
                                                                                                             
 72. 2015 SCC 5 (2/6/15). 
 73. Mouvement laïque Québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16 
(04/15/15). 
